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Con!ict in Ireland has a long history. Even after the Republic of Ireland was 
created as an independent state in 1920, the status of the mainly Protestant North 
remained contested. From the late 1960s a violent con!ict !ared up which claimed 
around 3,500 lives. Only more than two decades later, from 1993 onwards, emerged a 
peace process which, while initially fragile, culminated in a cessation of violence and 
a return to devolved government by 2007. The con!ict was a major source of social 
and economic dislocation. But, as peace took hold, this has begun to be repaired.
This paper assesses the impact of peace by using variation in violence within 
Northern Ireland to study one important economic aspect of the peace process and 
the dividend that it brought to residents of Northern Ireland—the impact on house 
prices. Houses are assets whose prices re!ect the present and future expected attrac-
tiveness of living in an area. Even during the height of the con!ict in Northern Ireland, 
violence was not uniform. For example, Belfast—the capital city of the province of 
Northern Ireland—was particularly hard hit. Looking for economic consequences of 
the peace process, we would therefore expect bene"ts to be concentrated among areas 
where violence was most prevalent. We exploit within-region variability in violence 
and house prices over time. Having such variation is rare in studies of the economic 
consequences of con!ict. Our speci"c measure of violence is con!ict related deaths. 
These have been well documented by Sutton (1994) and the Con!ict Archive on the 
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Internet (CAIN). Using these databases, we are able to match the location of the death 
to a region within Northern Ireland. We then look for a peace dividend in the form of 
increased house prices in response to a reduction in killing. For this we use a quarterly 
house price index for 11 regions of Northern Ireland for 1984:I to 2009:I.
We do not know exactly when peace arrived in Northern Ireland and whether its 
timing varied across regions of the province. Observed killings are, however, poten-
tially informative about the unobserved state that people care about—peace or con-
!ict. The article suggests a method for estimating the value of a local amenity whose 
presence cannot be easily determined but, under some structural assumptions, can 
be inferred from data. This contrasts with most existing studies of (dis)amenities on 
house prices. We suppose that citizens were using information about killings to update 
their views about the likelihood of the peace process holding strong, and we estimate 
the parameters of a Markov process generating transition probabilities across states. 
These parameters are used to construct an estimate of the expected present discounted 
value of deaths in each region as a function of the history of killing in that region. 
The empirical analysis suggests that there are bigger peace dividends in regions of 
Northern Ireland where violence was more severe and more persistent.
As we will show, our results are robust to a number of methods of estimation. We 
also "nd evidence of spillover effects across regions—violence in Belfast appears 
to have increased house prices in adjacent areas. This is consistent with the data on 
relative changes in population over our period of study.
The con!ict in Northern Ireland is an important historical event, and gauging 
the welfare effects of the successful conclusion of this con!ict is worthy of study 
in its own right. But there are wider implications for other long-running con!icts 
of this sort (i.e., those that involve sustained violence but not all-out warfare) such 
as those in Israel/Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Spain. Northern 
Ireland is one of the few modern examples we have from which to draw conclu-
sions about the value of peace and, thus, gauge the welfare cost of living in the 
midst of a violent con!ict. Below, we will draw out some speci"c lessons from 
this study for two of these con!icts.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we give 
some background to the Northern Irish con!ict. Section I relates our paper to the 
existing literature. In Section II, we discuss data and present some preliminary OLS 
results. Section III develops a model of house prices and a statistical model of the 
peace process. We then explain how this can be implemented empirically. Section IV 
presents results, including a number of robustness checks. Section V looks at impli-
cations of the approach for the ongoing con!icts in Iraq and for the Israel/Palestine 
con!icts. Section VI concludes.1
I. Background
From the seventeenth century onwards, the British consolidated their rule over Ireland. 
However, it was mainly in the nineteenth century that the struggle for reform began. 
The status of Ireland proved to be a fractious issue in UK politics over this century with 
1 Further details about the data and estimation methods are in an online Appendix.
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the issue of Irish home rule splitting the Liberal party at the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury. Northern Ireland was created after the Government of Ireland Act of 1920, which 
granted the rest of Ireland independence from the United Kingdom. Northern Ireland 
was governed by its own Parliament (Stormont) from 1922 to 1973. However, through-
out this period, the long-term status of Northern Ireland remained a contested issue. 
Within Northern Ireland, a mainly Protestant majority wished to remain part of the 
United Kingdom, while a large, mainly Catholic, minority campaigned for unity with 
the Republic. The Catholic minority in Northern Ireland were also, on the whole, less 
prosperous than the Protestant majority even though for much of this period, Northern 
Ireland had higher income per capita than the Republic of Ireland.
The era often referred to as the “The Troubles” spans the period from 1969 until 
the mid-1990s and encompasses the main period of con!ict studied. A series of 
events triggered a campaign of violence involving paramilitaries from both sides—
frequently referred to as Loyalists and Republicans, the former wishing to remain 
part of the United Kingdom and the latter seeking Irish unity. The main paramilitary 
organization on the Republican side was the Irish Republican Army (IRA). From 
1969, British troops were deployed on the streets of Northern Ireland and from 
1973, the British government suspended home rule and ran the province directly 
from Westminster. There were approximately 3,500 deaths over this period, of 
which around 1,840 were “civilians,” around 400 were members of “Republican” 
paramilitary groups, around 160 were members of “Loyalist” paramilitary groups, 
and 1,100 deaths were deaths of British or Irish security forces.
The peace process was initiated on December 15, 1993 when the Prime Ministers 
of Ireland and the United Kingdom signed the “Downing Street Declaration.” This 
af"rmed the right of the people of Northern Ireland to self-determination, and 
that the province would be transferred to the Republic of Ireland from the United 
Kingdom if and only if a majority of its population was in favor of such a move. It 
also pledged the governments to seek a peaceful constitutional settlement and prom-
ised that parties linked with paramilitaries (such as Sinn Féin) could take part in the 
talks, so long as they abandoned violence. In response to this, on August 31, 1994, 
the Irish Republican Army declared a cease "re.
The next event of major signi"cance was in 1998 when the Belfast Agreement 
(normally referred to as the Good Friday Agreement) was signed. Its key provisions 
include af"rmation of the principle that any change to the constitutional status of 
Northern Ireland could only follow a majority vote of its citizens, commitment by 
all parties to use “exclusively peaceful and democratic means” and establishment of 
a Northern Ireland Assembly with devolved legislative powers. On June 25, 1998, 
elections to a new Northern Ireland Assembly took place. Following this, on August 
15, 1998, the Omagh bombing by a breakaway faction of the IRA killed 29 people, 
leading to concerns about the stability of the peace process. Moreover, between 
October 14, 2002 and May 7, 2007, the Northern Ireland Assembly was suspended 
following allegations of spying.
The peace process took a further leap forward on July 28, 2005, when the IRA 
made a public statement ordering an end to the armed campaign and instructing its 
members to give up their arms and to pursue purely political means. Following this, 
on May 8, 2007, home rule was restored following fresh elections to the Northern 
Ireland Assembly.
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There is evidence that the population of Northern Ireland was aware of the posi-
tive consequences of the peace process.2 However, whether the peace process would 
ultimately be successful remained uncertain throughout. One of the major issues 
concerned the decommissioning of weapons and the process of veri"cation that 
would be needed to create mutual trust.
To get a feel for how successful the peace process was in reducing killing, we 
produce a graph (Figure 1) on aggregate killings in Northern Ireland over our data 
period.3 The rapid fall in violence after the IRA cease "re in 1994:IV is clearly 
apparent, as is the tick up after the Omagh bombing in 1998:III. By and large, the 
effect of the peace process in the aggregate is clear from Figure 1. Moreover, bomb-
ings and shootings data from the Police Service on Northern Ireland (PSNI) con"rm 
the sharp decline in aggregate violent incidents over the same period.4
II. Related Literature
This article is related to a large existing literature that looks at how amenities are 
capitalized into house prices. One important strand of this literature surveyed by Boyle 
and Kiel (2001) looks at the impact of environmental externalities on house prices. 
Their survey suggests rather mixed success in being able to explain differences in 
house prices by measures of air quality, water quality, land usage, and pollutants.
There is also a long tradition of looking at the relationship between school qual-
ity and house prices, which is particularly relevant in the United States given the 
2 The seventh report of Social Attitudes in Northern Ireland, for example, records a positive shift between the 
1989 and 1996 surveys in terms of how both Protestants and Catholics saw their relationship. For details, see 
Carmichael and Hughes (1998).
3 Details on this variable are provided in Section III.
4 Bombing incidents, for example, dropped from a yearly average of 480 between 1984 and 1994 to 50 incidents 
in 1995. For yearly statistics on bombings, shootings, and incendiaries see http://www.psni.police.uk/.
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Figure 1. Total Quarterly Killings in Northern Ireland
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extensive use of local property taxes to fund education. Kain and Quigley (1975) is 
a classic reference in this "eld. More recently, Black (1999) is an excellent example 
of how empirical studies of these issues can exploit differences within jurisdictions 
over time. Using the fact that she can locate people within a district who are close 
to boundaries, she "nds that a 5 percent improvement in test scores leads to a 2.5 
percent increase in house prices. Her study deals persuasively with the possibility 
of reverse causation issues that often plague such studies. Figlio and Lucas (2004) 
consider the impact of public school grades on house prices. They "nd that schools 
that persistently receive A grades have large and lasting house price premia.
Turning to disamenities, Davis (2004) considers the impact of leukemia cases 
on house prices in Nevada and "nds that house prices are reduced by a little over 
1 percent when there is a 1 in 10,000 increase in cancer risk. Linden and Rockoff 
(2008) use the exact location and moving-in date of sex offenders to estimate their 
impact on housing prices in the immediate proximity of the offender’s house. Their 
results suggest a price decrease of 4 percent of housing in a 0.1 mile radius around 
the sex offender’s home after he/she moved in. Gibbons (2004) uses a cross-section 
of London property crime data to estimate the impact of these crimes on housing 
prices. He "nds that an increase of one standard deviation in property damage goes 
hand in hand with a 10 percent drop in property prices.
There are a number of existing studies that look at the link between violence and 
economic outcomes. In the "rst study of its kind, Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) use 
a synthetically constructed region which has the same structural features as the Basque 
Country to identify the effect of con!ict related deaths on the economy. After the out-
break of terrorism in the late 1960s, per capita GDP in the Basque Country declined 
about 10 percentage points relative to a synthetic control region without terrorism. 
They also "nd that the stock prices of "rms with a signi"cant part of their business in 
the Basque Country showed a positive relative performance when truce became cred-
ible, and a negative relative performance at the end of the cease-"re.
Frey, Luechinger, and Stutzer (2009) study life satisfaction scores using the 
Eurobarometer and compare Northern Ireland with the rest of the United Kingdom 
and the Republic of Ireland, "nding that terrorist incidents are negatively corre-
lated with happiness. Willard, Guinnane, and Rosen (1996) use an event study 
to look at the impact of victories on the Union’s Greenback’s value in gold. 
Zussman, Zussman, and Nielsen (2008) look for a structural break in stock price 
returns in Israel and the Palestinian territories around key events affecting the 
Israeli-Palestinian con!ict. They "nd a signi"cant effect on asset prices. Similarly, 
Zussman and Zussman (2006) "nd an impact of Israeli assassinations of leaders 
on stock markets. In an ingenious contribution, Guidolin and La Ferrara (2007) 
look at the effect of war on the stock market value of "rms, using data from dia-
mond mining "rms in Angola. They use an event study methodology around the 
2002 death of the rebel movement leader to identify the effect of con!ict end. 
Collins and Margo (2007) study the impact of riots on property prices in a cross-
section of 104 US cities in the 1960s and ’70s. They argue that if a riot causes a 
sustained decline in perceived amenities, then this should show up in the relative 
decline of property values in the affected city. In order to tackle the endogene-
ity and unobserved heterogeneity problems, they instrument for riots with rain-
fall. Abadie and Dermisi (2008) show that, following the 9/11 attacks, vacancy 
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rates experienced a much more pronounced increase in the three most distinctive 
Chicago landmark buildings (the Sears Tower, the Aon Center, and the Hancock 
Center) and their vicinities than in other areas of the city of Chicago. Coyne, 
Dempster, and Isaacs (2010) worry about persistence of con!ict and look for a 
structural break in the time series of equity index prices in Sri Lanka.
Even though the Northern Ireland con!ict is not always classi"ed as a civil war on 
standard de"nitions, this article is also a contribution to the burgeoning economics 
literature on the causes and consequences of con!ict—see Elbadawi and Sambanis 
(2002) for a review. Most of that literature is focused on the causes rather than the 
consequences of violent con!ict. However, one important issue is how far the cessa-
tion of con!ict does lead to economic gains which have a self-reinforcing impact on 
peace. To the extent that capital losses on assets follow the onset of war, we should 
expect the mechanism that we study here to have an impact on the sustainability of 
peace in the long run. Given that housing is a major asset that is "xed in place, it is 
a good place to start in exploring the possibility of a peace dividend.
We use Markov chain dynamics in this article. This is also the strategy employed 
by Blomberg and Hess (2002), which analyzes the connection between economic 
well being and con!icts. Like ours, their analysis makes extensive use of persistence 
estimates of con!ict, peace, recession, and boom. However, their data does not allow 
these states to be de"ned endogenously as we do here. We show here that the measure-
ment of regional heterogeneity is likely to be affected by the way con!ict is de"ned.
III. Data and Benchmark Results
The data that we use comprise quarterly observations on 11 regions of Northern 
Ireland since October 1984.5 Our house price index comes from a survey of more 
than one thousand open market housing transactions each quarter. The index is an 
attempt to get at the average house price in a region. It is not surprising in the 
broader economic context of this period, which includes a housing boom in the 
United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland, that house prices have been increas-
ing. Average nominal house price growth was 9 percent per year with signi"cantly 
higher growth between 1993 and 2007.
We measure violence by the number of killings in a region—it is the clearest 
and most objectively measurable indicator of con!ict-related violence. We use the 
Con!ict Archive on the Internet (CAIN) website which records the details of every 
death arising from the present con!ict in Ireland, from newspaper cuttings, funerals, 
court records, cemeteries, and books and pamphlets. The record gives the date of 
death of every victim, the name, his or her age, “status” in relation to the con!ict, 
which organization was responsible, and a brief description of the circumstances of 
death. In addition, the dataset provides an almost exact address which allows us to 
locate the killing in one of the 11 regions for which we have house price data, thus 
generating the number of killings per quarter in each region. The killings data that 
we use include all deaths in Northern Ireland that are regarded as con!ict related by 
the CAIN website.
5 While we have data on killings before 1984, there is no disaggregated house price data available.
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The maps in Figure 2 give a sense of how violence varied across time in the 
regions that we study; darker shading refers to more intensive violence. It is clear 
from this that there is a large amount of heterogeneity in the incidence of violence 
across Northern Ireland. In particular, the maps show that while violence dropped 
radically in some regions, others are constantly peaceful on the measure that we use. 
An initial insight into how the peace process affected house prices in violent and 
less violent regions differentially can be gained from Figure 3, which displays the 
natural log of the average house price in the "ve most violent and six least violent 
regions in the 1990s. While average house prices were signi"cantly lower in violent 
regions in the years before the peace process began in 1993, they converge notice-
ably after the Downing Street Declaration.6
6 We restrict the time window for expositional purposes. The same pattern appears when plotting the prices for 
whole time series 1984–2009.
Five-year average of killing in Northern Ireland 
(1985:I–1989:IV)
Five-year average of killing in Northern Ireland 
(1990:I–1994:IV)
Five-year average of killing in Northern Ireland 
(1995:I–1999:IV)
Five-year average of killing in Northern Ireland 
(2000:I–2004:IV)
12+ deaths per year          4–12 deaths per year           1–4 deaths per year           0–1 deaths per year
Figure 2
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As a benchmark for what follows, we estimate the relationship between house 
prices and killings using the following semilog model:
(1) ln( H r t ) =  α r +  α t + β  y r t−1 +  ε r t ,
where ln( H r t ) is the natural log of our house price index for region r at date t,  y r t−1 
is the number of killings in region r lagged one quarter, i.e., at date t − 1,  α r are 
region dummies, and  α t are quarterly time dummies.7 We estimate (1) with the 
errors  ε r t clustered by region. We interpret β (which we expect to be negative) as an 
average treatment effect of a “killing” on the house price index. The key “identify-
ing” assumption is that there is no feedback from economic factors onto the pattern 
of violence conditional on ( α r ,  α t ).
An improvement in economic conditions following on from the peace process 
could also be the conduit for the effect of violence on house prices. To some extent, 
we will be able to see whether or not this is the case by including the unemployment 
rate, which fell sharply over this period, as a time varying regressor. We will also 
include region-speci"c time trends for similar reasons.
The results are in Table 1. Throughout the article we normalize our violence vari-
ables by their standard deviation to ensure comparability across columns. Column 
1 gives the raw correlation between quarterly killings and house prices in the fol-
lowing quarter excluding any region or time effects. This correlation is negative and 
signi"cant. Column 2 includes region effects, and the correlation remains negative, 
although it increases in size. Quarterly dummies are added in column 3. As expected 
from the common trends in regional housing prices, taking out macro-effects in this 
way leads to a much smaller, although still negative and signi"cant, correlation. 
Column 4 shows that this correlation is robust to the introduction of region-speci"c 
time trends. Column 5 lags killings by half a year, and the negative correlation result 
7 We use the three-month lag of killing as house sales tend to take a while to go through. Hence, our index of 
house prices probably re!ects sales that were agreed some time previously. All of our results hold if we include the 
contemporaneous level of killing instead.
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Figure 3. Development of House Prices at the Start of the Peace Process
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holds up (becoming a little larger in size). The estimate is robust to controlling for 
unemployment, which takes on the expected sign. The sample here is smaller due 
to unemployment data being available only for a more limited time period. As a 
reality check, we put together a series on yearly earnings data in the tourist industry 
by region. Column 7 con"rms the general pattern that we found with house prices.8
While these results are interesting, they are somewhat dif"cult to interpret in eco-
nomic terms. Killings are being used to proxy here for the disamenity of living in 
an area of Northern Ireland that is in con!ict. We would expect potential residents 
to care about the expected value of the future utility !ows from this disamenity. 
However, unlike most standard (dis)amenities like crime, disease, or good schools, 
whether a region of Northern Ireland is at peace or not (arguably the thing that 
residents should care about when buying a house) is not directly observed. We have 
only a rough sense that peace came to Northern Ireland some time after 1994, and 
the probability that a particular region of Northern Ireland is in a state of con!ict is 
unknown. Moreover, it is unlikely to be a simple function of whether a killing took 
place in the current quarter, or even a linear function of the number of killings. To 
8 The coef"cient indicates that one death is correlated with a loss of 1.5 million pounds of yearly tourism income. 
This is 6 percent of the average yearly tourism income.
Table 1—Benchmark Results
Coef"cient
ln(house 
price)(1)
ln(house 
price)(2)
ln(house 
price)(3)
ln(house 
price)(4)
ln(house 
price)(5)
ln(house 
price)(6)
Pounds (millions) 
earned 
in tourist 
industry(7)
Killings −0.177*** −0.212*** −0.0133*** −0.00771** −0.0107* −1.584***(0.0191) (0.0454) (0.00492) (0.00295) (0.00493) (0.433)
Killings (lagged −0.0187***
  two quarters) (0.00361)
ln(unemployment) −0.141***(0.0408)
Observations 1,049 1,049 1,049 1,049 1,049 932 99
Region "xed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time "xed effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region-speci"c 
 time trends
No No No Yes No No No
R2 0.076 0.089 0.987 0.989 0.988 0.986 0.416
Notes: The time periods are 1984:IV to 2009:I for columns 1 through 5; 1987:III to 2001:I in column 6, and 1993 to 
2001 in column 7. OLS standard errors are reported in columns 1 and 7; standard errors are clustered at the region 
level in columns 2 through 6. All explanatory variables are lagged by one quarter. Deaths in columns 1 through 6 
are normalized by their standard deviation. In column 7, the left-hand side variable is a three-year moving average 
from 1993 to 2001. Deaths are yearly averages lagged by four years. 
*** Signi"cant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Signi"cant at the 5 percent level.
  * Signi"cant at the 10 percent level.
Sources: Killings are con!ict-related killings from Sutton (1994). Unemployment is measured using the claimant 
counts from the UK of"ce for National Statistics. The house price is the average overall housing transaction price 
recorded by the University of Ulster. Earnings in the tourist industry is from the Northern Ireland Tourist Board.
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make progress on this, we develop a statistical model of the peace process and the 
way that killings changed the probability of sustained peace.
IV. A Model of House Prices and Violence
In this section, we develop a theoretical model linking house prices and violence. 
We then posit a stochastic model for the peace process. We discuss how the param-
eters of this model can be estimated using methods that have been developed to 
model business cycle dynamics.
A. House Prices
We assume a standard dividend-discount model of house prices where houses are 
in"nitely lived and potential home owners have rational expectations. Assume also 
that the consumption value of the house (the dividend) in region r at date t can be 
decomposed into a “standard” part based on amenities such as location and a part 
which depends on the level of violence. We write this as:
(2)  u r t =  h r + α  y r t ,
where  h r is the standard consumption value of housing based on "xed locational 
factors,  y r t is violence in period t, and − α > 0 is the peace dividend that represents 
how the absence of violence is being valued by residents. We treat the component 
h r as "xed by region for simplicity of exposition. In the empirical analysis we allow 
there to be a common time effect and a region-speci"c time trend.
We interpret α, in line with the literature on amenities and house prices, as rep-
resenting the local public bad associated with killings in a neighborhood. In our 
context, this is more plausible than thinking about the personal risk of being a vic-
tim. In part, therefore, α should pick up the general change in the environment and 
defensive measures taken to protect citizens which lowered the quality of life for 
residents during the “Troubles.”
The present value of the dividend stream determines house prices. It is now given by:
(3) E[  ∑ 
i=0
∞
 ( β i  u r t+i ) |  ψ r t ,  θ r ] =   h r  _ 1 − β + αE[  ∑ i=0∞ ( β i y r t+i ) |  ψ r t ,  θ r ],
where  ψ r t denotes the history of violence in region r up to time t,  θ r are the param-
eters of the process generating violence in region r, and β denotes the discount rate, 
which is assumed to be common across time and regions.
The impact of current violence on house prices will now depend on how it changes 
the second term in (3). If more killings lead potential home owners to update their 
view of future violence, then we expect a negative relationship between (3) and 
violence in region r at date t. But this depends critically on the properties of the 
assumed process for  y r t , which is affected by the peace process—an unobserved 
state which potential homeowners are estimating.
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B. The Peace Process
We model the peace process as an independent Markov chain. Let  s r t ∈ { pce, con} 
be a state variable for region r at date t, where pce denotes peace and con denotes 
con!ict. We do not observe the state directly—we can only measure the amount of 
violence  y r t . We posit that they are linked through the following “switching” model:
(4)  y r t =  * rpce (1 − δ( s r t )) +  * rcon δ( s r t ) +  ε r t with  ε r t ∼ N(0, σ r s r t  2 ),
where δ( pce) = 0 and δ(con) = 1. Thus,  * rpce is the mean number of killings in 
the peaceful state and  * rcon is the number of killings in con!ict. This allows for the 
possibility that  * rpce > 0.9 This approach is broadly consistent with the standard 
approach taken in the literature on civil wars where there is a threshold level of kill-
ings which needs to be passed before a region or country is deemed to be in a state 
of civil war.10
We allow the mean (and variance) of violence in each region to be a function of 
the state,  s r t . The transition matrix between states is given by:
   s r t−1 = con  s r t−1 = pce
  s r t = con  p r 1 −  q r 
  s r t = pce 1 −  p r  q r .
Linking this to (3), let  θ r ≡ {  * r con ,  * r pce , σ rcon 2 ,  σ rpce 2 ,  p r ,  q r } be the parameters of the 
peace process.
The forecast for the next period is dependent on the belief on the state  s r t now, 
which is based on  θ r and the history of violence denoted  ψ r t , available up to period t, 
which includes all past killings in the region. This gives us the following expression 
for the second term in (3), the present value of killings:11
(5) E[  ∑ 
i=0
∞
 ( β i  y r t+i ) |  ψ r t ,  θ r ]
 =   * rcon  pi r +  * rpce  (1 −  pi r )  __ 
1 − β  + ( * rcon −  * rpce )  
P( s r t = con |  ψ r t ,  θ r ) −  pi r    __
1 −  λ r  β  ,
where
  pi r ≡  1 −  q r  _  2 −  p r −  q r  ,  λ r =  q r +  p r − 1,
9 In other words, a low level of sectarian violence in some parts of Northern Ireland can be consistent with 
“peace.”
10 This is true, for example, in the widely used Armed Con!ict Dataset (ACD); see http://www.iiss.org/
publications/armed-con!ict-database/.
11 See our discussion paper for details.
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and
 P( s r t = con |  ψ r t ,  θ r ) = 1 − P( s r t = pce |  ψ r t ,  θ r )
is the probability of con!ict at each date.
This has an intuitive interpretation. The "rst expression is the mean discounted 
present value of “permanent” violence which is most easily seen when either peace 
is an absorbing state ( pi r = 0) or con!ict is an absorbing state ( pi r = 1).
The second expression varies over time in response to how information derived 
from the history of violence over the relevant time period is updated. The term 
shows that the impact of P( s r t = con |  ψ r t ,  θ r ) on expected violence is affected by the 
general persistence of the violence process,  λ r . More speci"cally, a  λ r close to one 
means that both peace and con!ict are highly persistent, and a switch from peace to 
con!ict has a large impact on the present value of violence.
The next step is to estimate  θ r . This can be used to construct an estimate of (5). 
We will call this estimate  ˆ  PDV r t , and we will use it as a regressor to explain house 
prices in line with equation (3) with the term  h r /(1 − β ) being absorbed in the 
region "xed effect.
C. Implementation
We estimate  θ r and P( s r t = con |  ψ r t ,  θ r ) from the data on violence  y r t using a 
well-known "lter suggested by Hamilton (1989, 1990) for estimating the dynamics 
of business cycle states. Details of the implementation using the EM Algorithm, 
which is largely standard, are available in our discussion paper.12
Table 2 presents the results of running the EM Algorithm for each of the 11 
regions separately. The four columns report our estimates of *rcon, *rpce,  p r , and  q r . 
12 On the link between the EM Algorithm and the Maximum Likelihood estimator see Dempster, Laird, and 
Rubin (1977).
Table 2—EM Estimation of Region-Specific Markov Chain Parameters
Mean deaths
per quarter
in con!ict
Mean deaths
per quarter
in peace
Probability of a 
quarter of con!ict 
following con!ict
Probability of a 
quarter of peace
following peace
Belfast 8.114 1.334 0.935 0.956
North Down 1.114 0.000 0.268 0.877
Lisburn 1.333 0.000 0.288 0.799
East Antrim 1.431 0.000 0.074 0.851
Londonderry/Strabane 1.811 0.111 0.962 0.965
Antrim/Ballymena 0.986 0.000 0.000 0.894
Coleraine/Limavady N Coast 1.648 0.000 0.000 0.926
Enniskillen/Fermanagh/S Tyrone 1.686 0.000 0.765 0.880
Mid Ulster 3.661 0.000 0.746 0.857
Mid and South Down 2.388 0.093 0.967 0.969
Craigavon/Armagh 3.273 0.266 0.643 0.844
Notes: Estimates obtained through application of the EM Algorithm discussed in Hamilton (1990) for each region 
separately.
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These tell us about the levels of violence in the two states and the persistence. Quite 
clearly, Belfast is the most violent region with almost eight killings per quarter in 
con!ict and over one in peacetime. Other regions such as Londonderry/Strabane or 
Mid/South Down are less violent on average but also display long persistence in 
their con!ict (high values of  p r ). As noted earlier, this persistence is an important 
feature of a con!ict because it increases the effect that current violence can have on 
expectations about violence in future.
This point becomes clear by comparing two regions in our data: Londonderry/
Strabane and East Antrim. East Antrim features similar estimates of  * rcon and  * rpce to 
Londonderry/Strabane, but we estimate that  p r is fairly close to zero. That implies 
that outbreaks of violence will have relatively little impact on expectations of future 
violence in East Antrim, since con!ict is not persistent.13
Having obtained  ˆ  θr , an estimate of the peace process parameters, we combine this 
with the history of violence,  y r t , to create a region-speci"c time series for the prob-
ability of con!ict: P( s r t = con |  ψ r t ,  ˆ  θr ).14 To illustrate this graphically, we take the 
mean estimates from Table 2 to construct
(6)  ˆ  yr t =  ˆ  *rpce + ( ˆ  *rcon −  ˆ  *rpce )P( s r t = con |  ψ r t ,  ˆ  θr ).
Figure 4 illustrates this for three of our regions: Belfast, Londonderry/Strabane, and 
Lisburn. One immediate observation is that only a relatively narrow band of move-
ments in violence triggers a change in P( s r t = con |  ψ r t ,  ˆ  θr ) and, hence, in the "tted 
value  ˆ  yr t . This is because the estimated likelihood of con!ict is mostly either close 
to one or zero. Nonetheless, we regard this as a reasonable way of weighting the 
data, since a change between 10 and 20 killings, for example, carries less informa-
tion about whether, say, Belfast is in con!ict than a change from zero to ten killings.
Our estimate of the present value of violence as in equation (3) can be obtained by 
combining the "tted values  ˆ  yr t with our persistence estimates  ˆ  pr and  ˆ  qr . In fact, the 
only time-varying element in equation (5) is
(7) ( ˆ  *con −  ˆ  *pce )  P( s r t = con |  ψ r t ,  ˆ  θr ) __  
1 −  ˆ  λr β =  
 ˆ  yr t −  ˆ  *rpce  _
1 −  ˆ  λr β  ,
where  ˆ  λr =  ˆ  qr +  ˆ  pr − 1 is an estimate of the overall persistence of the Markov 
chain. Thus, the present value of violence moves with the estimated level of kill-
ings  ˆ  yr t and is increasing in the persistence parameter  ˆ  λr . The impact of an additional 
killing will therefore be highest if it triggers a change of the con!ict probability in a 
region with a highly persistent violence process.
The importance of factoring in persistence is illustrated by comparing the graphs 
of the violent regions Belfast and Londonderry/Strabane with the graph for Lisburn 
13 The fact that  λ r < 0 in this case does not affect the result. In fact, our regression results remain unchanged if 
the three violence time series for which this is the case were replaced with zeros.
14 The starting vector is θ = {3, 0, 0.5, 0.5, 3, 1}. Convergence is very fast (around 25 iterations), and we experi-
mented with starting values to check that the results are robust.
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(Figure 4). While Lisburn had some violent incidents, the violence there rarely per-
sisted for more than one quarter. In line with this observation, Table 2 con"rms that 
our estimate of  p r is 0.288 for Lisburn, which is low compared to the corresponding 
estimate of over 0.9 for Belfast and Londonderry/Strabane. Thus, we would expect 
a change from peace to con!ict to have somewhat different implications for expecta-
tions and, hence, house prices in the three regions. If we were only to use  ˆ  yr t directly 
to explain house prices, this would be ignored.
V. Results
This section presents the core results as well as a number of variants and robust-
ness checks.
A. Core Results
The core results are presented in Table 3. They are estimates from running regres-
sions of the form:
(8) ln( H r t ) =  α r +  α t + β ˆ  PDV r t−1 +  ε r t ,
Table 3—Main Results
ln(house price) ln(house price) ln(house price) ln(house price) ln(house price) ln(house price) ln(house price)
Coef"cient (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Present value of −0.0604*** −0.0575*** −0.0601*** −0.0415** −0.156***
 killings (r = 5%) (0.0147) (0.0154) (0.0142) (0.0173) (0.0511)
Present value of −0.209***
 killings (r = 1%) (0.0496)
Present value of −0.0595***
 killings (r = 5%), 
 lagged
(0.0129)
ln (unemployment) −0.141***(0.0414)
Housing starts 0.0188***
(0.00860)
Observations 1,049 1,049 1,049 932 924 1,049 1,441
Regions 11 11 11 11 11 11 15
Region "xed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time "xed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region-speci"c time 
 trends
No No No No No Yes Yes
R2 0.988 0.988 0.988 0.987 0.986 0.989 0.962
Notes: The time periods are 1984:IV to 2009:I for columns 1–3, 6–7; 1987:III–2009:I for column 4, and 
1988:II–2009:I in column 5. Standard errors are clustered at the region level. All explanatory variables are lagged 
by one quarter. Present values and private starts are normalized by their standard deviation. Column 7 adds quarterly 
UK house price series from the Nationwide Building Society: North West, Yorkshire, East Midlands, and Wales.
*** Signi"cant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Signi"cant at the 5 percent level.
  * Signi"cant at the 10 percent level.
Sources: Present value of killings are calculated (see equation (5) in the text) from the con!ict-related killings and 
the EM estimates in Table 2. Unemployment is measured using the claimant counts from the UK of"ce for National 
Statistics. The house price is the average overall housing transaction price recorded by the University of Ulster. 
Housing starts are private housing starts from the District Council Building Control Of"ces.
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where, as above,  α r are region dummies, and  α t are quarterly time dummies. The 
variable  ˆ  PDV r t−1 is our computed measure of the expected discounted number of 
future killings from (3) as computed in the previous section. The results are reported 
with standard errors clustered by region.15 We will assess the robustness of the 
approach to timing and the assumed discount factor. As our baseline case we choose 
a 5 percent discount rate.
Column 1 of Table 3 shows that there is a signi"cant negative correlation 
between our (lagged) measure of the discounted value of violence and house 
prices. Below, we will discuss the size of this effect in economic terms. Column 
2 shows that this correlation remains when the present value is calculated with a 
discount rate of 1 percent. Although the size of the coef"cient changes quite dra-
matically, as we will discuss below, it is similar in magnitude from an economic 
point of view.
In column 3, we test robustness of our core result to lagging our present discounted 
value measure by half a year. The result is robust. Columns 4 and 5, respectively, 
introduce the unemployment rate and private housing starts as additional regressors. 
The latter is included to try to control for any changes in housing supply. The coef-
"cient on the present discounted value measure of killings is identical. Finally, col-
umn 6 introduces region-speci"c time trends. Although the size of the coef"cient is 
a little smaller, the core correlation that we would expect if there is a genuine peace 
dividend is present in the data.16
Given the availability of regional data our focus here is on within-Northern 
Ireland comparisons. We argue that identifying the costs of the con!ict from 
within variation is relatively clean as factors that affected all regions in the same 
way are automatically held constant. However, this might lead to an underes-
timate of the true cost of con!ict, as a lot of the time variation related to con-
!ict is captured by the time "xed effects. In column 7 of Table 3, we add four 
other regions from the United Kingdom (North West England, Yorkshire, East 
Midlands, and Wales) as an additional control group, with the present value of 
killings being set to zero for these regions over the whole period that we study.17 
The coef"cient on the present value of violence triples in size in this speci"ca-
tion, suggesting that our within–Northern Ireland estimates of the peace dividend 
are in all likelihood a lower bound.
Taken together, these results provide convincing evidence of a Northern Ireland 
peace dividend.
15 We have also estimated the standard errors using a bootstrap method given that the distribution of  ˆ  PDV r t−1 is 
not known and there is the possibility of generated regressor bias. Details of this method and results are available 
from the authors. In essence, it involved drawing 1,000 replications from the violence data for each region and 
computing the EM estimate  ˆ  θr for each replication. The  ˆ  θr estimates were used to generate an empirical frequency 
distribution of  ˆ  PDV r t−1 to calculate standard errors. Results are available in the online Appendix.
16 We also introduced squared and cubic time trends with identical results.
17 These data on house prices come from the Nationwide Building Society. The choice of these regions was 
based on the level of house prices being similar to Northern Ireland’s in 2009:IV. The results do not change sub-
stantively if we use a larger set of comparators: North, North West, Yorkshire, East Midlands, Wales, and Scotland.
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B. Extended Results
In this section we investigate some alternative speci"cations and assess the robust-
ness of the "ndings.18 These extended results appear in Table 4.
18 There are two other robustness checks not reported in Table 4. First, we used a Poisson model instead of a 
Normal distribution in "tting the Markov switching model. The EM algorithm had problems converging in the very 
low violence regions so we set the level of violence to zero and used the estimates only for regions with signi"cant 
amounts of violence. The "ndings are very similar to those in Table 3 and are presented in the online Appendix. 
Second, we estimated the Markov model on all of the violence data (before the period where our house price data 
begins). Again the results in Table 3 were also robust to doing this.
Table 4—Extended Results
ln(house price) ln(house price) ln(house price) ln(house price) ln(house price) ln(house price) ln(house price)
Coef"cient (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Con!ict (present value −0.0209**
 at r = 5%) (0.00732)
Present value of  −0.0463*** −0.0363**  −0.0280**
 killings (r = 5%)
 single index EM 
 calculations
(0.0142) ( 0.0151) (0.0108)
ln (unemployment) −0.126**(0.0425)
Present value of  −0.0436** 
 killings per capita (0.0152)
Present value of  −0.0359** −0.0556**
 killings (r = 5%) (0.0122) (0.0196)
Boundary to Belfast 0.0327*
  × PV (0.0167)
Boundary to Londond./ 0.0266
 Strab. × PV (0.0377)
Boundary to mid Ulster −0.00742
 × PV (0.0368)
Boundary to mid/ −0.0823***
 South Down × PV (0.0156)
Boundary to −0.0230
 Craigavon/ Armagh × PV (0.0346)
Observations 1,049 1,049 924 1,049 1,049 953 1,049
Region "xed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time "xed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region-speci"c time 
 trend
Yes No No Yes No No No
R2 0.989 0.988 0.987 0.989 0.987  0.988 0.988
Notes: The time periods are 1984:IV–2009:I for columns 1–3 and 5–7 and 1987:III–2009:I for column 6. Standard 
errors are clustered at the region level. All explanatory variables are lagged by one quarter. All violence variables 
in columns 1–6 are normalized by their respective standard deviation. PV-interactions use present value calculated 
at 5 percent of respective region. Column 1 uses the present value of the con!ict probability. Columns 2–4 use the 
single index model (see Section VB). Column 6 excludes Belfast.
*** Signi"cant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Signi"cant at the 5 percent level.
  * Signi"cant at the 10 percent level.
Sources: Present value of killings (equation 5) and present values of con!ict (Section VB) are calculated from the 
con!ict-related killings and the EM estimates in Table 2. Unemployment is measured using claimant counts from 
the UK of"ce for National Statistics. The house price is the average overall housing transaction price recorded by 
the University of Ulster. Per capita calculations use population from the 1991 census from the Census Of"ce for 
Northern Ireland.
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We have supposed that it is aggregate killing within a region which re!ects the ame-
nity cost of living in a neighborhood. However, another interpretation of the results is 
that it is the probability of the unobserved latent state—peace or con!ict—that really 
matters to residents. After all, there are many aspects of violence beyond killings that 
made life during the Troubles unpleasant, and these are likely to be correlated with 
killings. Suppose instead, therefore, that house prices are not affected by killings but 
by the underlying state  s r t . Hence the utility !ow from a house is now:
(9)  u r t =  h r + α′ δ( s r t ).
In this case, the peace dividend is α′ and the amenity being valued is peace itself. 
This slightly modi"ed utility function gives rise to the following present discounted 
value of housing in region r at date t:
(10) E[  ∑ 
i=0
 ∞ ( β i P( s r t = con |  ψ r t ,  θ r ))] =  1 −  q r +  h r   _1 − β  +  P( s r t = con |  ψ r t ,  θ r ) __  1 −  λ r β .
Our method is easily adapted to assess the robustness of our "ndings to this alterna-
tive view as we already have an estimate of  λ r and P( s r t = con |  ψ r t ,  θ r ). Following 
this, column 1 of Table 4 includes the estimated value of
  P( s r t = con |  ψ r t ,  θ r ) __  
1 −  λ r  β 
as regressor in place of  ˆ  PDV r t .
A similar qualitative story emerges to what we found in Table 3. In particular, the 
results remain robust to including region-speci"c time trends. The magnitude of the 
effect, however, is relatively low. This is perhaps not too surprising given that  ˆ  PDV r t 
can be thought of as an interaction term between the probability of con!ict and the 
region-speci"c difference between killings in peace and violence: ( * rcon −  * rpce ). 
Hence, by focusing only on the con!ict probability in the speci"cation in column 
1 of Table 4, we are neglecting the additional regional heterogeneity re!ecting the 
intensity of violence.
Our independent Markov chain model is !exible in that it allows each region of 
Northern Ireland to be in a state of peace or con!ict independently. Hence, home 
owners are deemed to make a local assessment of the peace process and what it 
means for them in the region. However, another plausible view is that the core 
assessment on peace is a macroeconomic effect based on all violence in Northern 
Ireland.19 On this view, we should model the probability of peace as a single index.
We implement this idea as follows. First, we add all the regional quarterly killings 
to create an aggregate Northern Irish time series of killings. This time series is then 
fed into the EM Algorithm to produce an estimate of the probability of con!ict for 
Northern Ireland as a whole which is denoted by P( s t = con |  ψ t ,  θ t ). In a second 
19 We are grateful to Daron Acemoglu for persuading us to look at this alternative interpretation.
828 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW APRIL 2012
step, we test the extent to which this overall probability of violence for Northern 
Ireland can explain the variation in regional violence. We do this simply by running 
11 OLS regressions, one for each region, as follows:
(11)  y r t =  γ r +  τ r P( s t = con |  ψ t ,  θ t ) +  ε r t .
This provides us with an estimate of the average level of violence in peace ( γ r ) and 
the impact of the con!ict ( τ r ) on the level of violence for each region. Depending on 
the magnitudes of regional violence and the correlation with P( s t = con |  ψ t ,  θ t ), this 
gives a new estimate of the mean levels of violence during peace and con!ict. (The 
estimated region-speci"c intercept is the average death count in peacetime, while 
the estimated constant plus slope coef"cient are the average death count in con!ict.) 
Note, however, that not all coef"cients that we estimate this way are statistically 
signi"cant. Most peaceful regions, for example, have no signi"cant slope coef"-
cient, implying no impact of the estimated Northern Irish con!ict on their regional 
violence levels, i.e., the series P( s t = con |  ψ t ,  θ t ) is simply not correlated with the 
y r t for such regions. As a "nal step we use all slopes and constants in each region to 
generate a panel of "tted killings.20 We then proceed as in the previous section to 
generate an estimate,  ˆ  PDV r t which we include as a regressor. Note that in this speci-
"cation there is no difference between the present value and "tted killings because 
the persistence parameters p and q are now identical across regions, i.e., there is 
single estimate of λ for all of Northern Ireland.
Columns 2 to 4 in Table 4 report the regression results when this single index 
approach is used. The core results are robust to this method—a negative correla-
tion between house prices and this region-speci"c measure of violence remains. As 
with the core results, this "nding is robust to including unemployment and region-
speci"c time trends as regressors (columns 3 and 4).
Our analysis implicitly assumes that violence is a local public bad whose impact 
on welfare is independent of population size. However, one possibility is that people 
care less about violence when their personal probability of being affected by vio-
lence is lower. This would be captured by looking at per capita rather than aggre-
gate deaths within a region. To explore this, we use the present value per capita as 
a regressor in column 5 of Table 4. Our core result is robust to this. Also, it should 
be noted that if we use both the per capita and the nonweighted present value in the 
same regression only our original present value measure is statistically signi"cant.21 
Thus, our results do not appear to be driven in any way by population numbers in 
more violent areas.
We can also check whether the results are driven by the most violent region in 
the data, namely Belfast. There is a risk that this observation is the most in!uential 
for our "ndings. To test for this, column 6 in Table 4 reports the results excluding 
Belfast. The coef"cient is only slightly smaller and is still strongly signi"cant.
20 Our results are robust to using only the signi"cant coef"cients for generating the  ˆ  yr t .
21 We also checked whether the level of presample violence in each region or measures of Protestant-Catholic 
polarization affect the relative impact of violence on the house price. In each case the interaction with our  ˆ  PDV r t 
variable is insigni"cant if the original  ˆ  PDV r t is added.
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Our core results assume that the impact of violence is con"ned to the geographic 
area for which we measure house prices. However, it may be that home owners care 
about the level of violence in other regions when choosing where to live. This could 
either be because of a direct spillover or because home owners are choosing ex ante 
where to live creating general equilibrium price changes.
To consider this possibility, we look for spillover effects from the most violent 
regions: Belfast, Craigavon/Armagh, Londonderry/Strabane, Mid Ulster and Mid/
South Down onto house prices in adjacent regions. Thus, we create a dummy vari-
able denoting whether a region has a boundary with one of these regions and inter-
act that with the  ˆ  PDV r t in the adjacent region. These interaction terms are shown 
in column 6 and give us an interesting "nding. First, we "nd a core “own correla-
tion” which is negative and signi"cant and of similar magnitude to the core results. 
Among the interaction terms all results bar Belfast are suggestive of a negative spill-
over of violence across regions. However, only one of these coef"cients is signi"-
cant at a 5 percent level.22 The correlation of house prices in adjacent neighborhoods 
with Belfast is positive. This is consistent with a !ight away from living in Belfast 
to adjacent neighborhoods in response to the violence. Although we do not have 
evidence on migration directly, this explanation is consistent with broad changes 
in population captured by population statistics provided by the Northern Ireland 
Statistics and Research Agency (NISRA). According to their data, population in 
Belfast declined from 316,358 inhabitants in 1981 to 267,374 in 2006.23 The view 
that this re!ects at least partly local migration is supported by the fact that popula-
tion increased in all other 24 local government districts throughout the same period.
C. Economic Signi"cance
We now consider the size of effect that is predicted by our empirical models. For 
this, we take the result in column 1 in Table 3 and use it to compute the 95 percent 
con"dence interval of the percentage change in house prices associated with a unit 
change in the present value of killing. The boundaries of this interval are then mul-
tiplied by the region-speci"c estimates of the present value of killings in con!ict 
minus those in peace. The results are in Table 5, which also gives the (normalized) 
present value estimates.
Our Markov switching model predicts that peace leads to an increase in house 
prices of between 1.3 percent and 3.5 percent, all else equal. However, these effects 
are highly heterogeneous across regions. For Belfast, where violence was greatest, 
the estimate for a change in house prices is between 5.9 percent and 16.6 percent 
using a 5 percent discount rate.
It is interesting to compare these results with what would emerge from the average 
coef"cient on killings, which we estimate from the benchmark OLS model. These 
appear in the "nal three columns of Table 5. We allow this effect to be heterogeneous 
across regions by applying our estimates of the mean difference in violence from 
22 The Mid/South Down region had a relatively high share of killings of British Army soldiers—it is not unrea-
sonable that the effect of these killings is less local.
23 NISRA population data is available online under http://www.nisra.gov.uk/. The population statistics give 
population densities and area.
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estimates in the Markov switching model. This model predicts a smaller effect of 
violence on house prices compared to the model based on a  ˆ  PDV r t calculation. The 
95 percent con"dence interval ranges from 0.5 percent to 1.4 percent. But more 
striking is the way that the models handle heterogeneity in the impact of violence. 
For Belfast, the estimate is from 2.3 percent to 5.6 percent with the upper bound 
lying below the lower bound of the model based on  ˆ  PDV r t . In general all the esti-
mates of the benchmark model in more violent regions are lower than their counter-
parts based on the Markov switching model.
The magnitudes found are not closely tied to the speci"c estimates that we use 
from among those presented in Tables 3 and 4. They are essentially unaffected by 
using the estimates for a 1 percent discount rate when we compute  ˆ  PDV r t . Estimates 
from the single index model described in the previous section also yield very simi-
lar results.24 This robustness is encouraging, suggesting that choosing between this 
model of an aggregate peace process and the region-by-region model is of no great 
signi"cance to the economic "ndings of the article.
VI. Relevance to Other Con!icts
The method that we are proposing for looking at con!ict is potentially applicable 
in other contexts. Here, we illustrate this for two other contemporary con!icts.
First, we ran the Markov switching model on time series data on civilian casual-
ties in Iraq. Since Iraq is not at peace at the moment, it is a bit dif"cult to think in 
terms of a peace dividend. But we are able to calibrate the economic impact of the 
24 These are available in the online Appendix.
Table 5—Economic Significance of Region-Specific EM Model and Semi-Log Regression Estimates
Present value estimates Semi-log estimates
Present value 
of violence (r = 5%) 
in con!ict
Present value 
of violence (r = 5%) during 
peacetime
Impact of con!ict on 
house prices in percent (95% con"dence interval)
Mean level 
of violence 
in period 
1983–1994
Impact of con!ict on 
house prices in percent (95% con"dence interval)
Lower bound Upper bound Lower bound Upper bound
Belfast 4.67 2.82 5.87 16.58 7.114 2.30 5.74
North Down 0.19 0.13 0.17 0.48 0.091 0.03 0.07
Lisburn 0.30 0.24 0.19 0.53 0.545 0.18 0.44
East Antrim 0.22 0.17 0.17 0.49 0.205 0.07 0.17
Londonderry/Strabane 1.13 0.53 1.91 5.39 1.909 0.62 1.54
Antrim/Ballymena 0.12 0.08 0.12 0.33 0.114 0.04 0.09
Coleraine/ Limavady N Coast
0.16 0.09 0.20 0.57 0.182 0.06 0.15
Enniskillen/Fermanagh/ S Tyrone
0.62 0.44 0.57 1.62 1.318 0.43 1.06
Mid Ulster 1.38 1.04 1.08 3.04 2.341 0.76 1.89
Mid and South Down 1.51 0.63 2.77 7.83 2.455 0.79 1.98
Craigavon/Armagh 1.20 0.97 0.73 2.07 2.205 0.71 1.78
Average 1.05 0.65 1.25 3.54 1.68 0.54 1.36
Average (population 
 weights)
1.58 0.97 1.93 5.44
Notes: Present values are normalized by their overall standard deviation. Population weights are by 1991 popula-
tion from NI census. Mean level of violence in peace is assumed to be zero for the calculation of the peace dividend 
with the raw violence data.
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“surge” which began in early 2007. Our model predicts a change of state in the 
underlying violence generating process in the summer of 2008—some time after the 
surge began. We apply our estimate of the peace dividend assuming that violence in 
Iraq were to drop to levels that we have calibrated in Belfast after the peace process 
with a similar level of persistence. However, we scale up the size of the effect to 
re!ect the population size difference between Belfast and Iraq.25 Our estimate of 
the peace dividend for Iraq after the surge is then around 30 percent of house prices.
Second, we look at the Israel/Palestine con!ict where we use data provided by 
Jaeger and Paserman (2008) to estimate the parameters of a peace process between 
September 2000 and December 2005. Again, we use a single time series which picks 
up broad trends such as the rise of violence at the end of 2000, the brief decline at 
the end 2003 and the longer lasting decline in violence after February 2005.
In order to get some idea of how the economy reacts to violence we matched the 
raw violence data and our estimates with stock market data from the Tel Aviv stock 
exchange. Table 6 shows the correlation between our generated con!ict probability 
measure and a stock market index. For comparison we also show the correlation 
between the raw deaths data and the stock market value. Our estimated con!ict 
probability seems to explain a higher share of the variation (R2 of 0.57 as opposed 
to 0.23). A straight OLS regression of stock market values on the probability of 
con!ict suggests that the perception of an end to the Intifada would correspond to a 
stock market recovery of roughly 56 percent.26
25 The described calculations lead to a present value of civilian deaths during peace in Iraq of 8,176 and 15,070 
in con!ict. The difference needs to be normalized to make it comparable to the Northern Ireland data (standard 
deviation of the present value is 23, while population is roughly 61 times higher in Iraq than in Belfast). Using the 
estimate from Table 3 we get: 15,070 − 8,176/61 × 23 × 100 × 0.0604 = 29. 68.
26 Note, however, that this estimate could be driven by a host of omitted factors. An application of our within–
Northern Ireland estimates (using a similar method to that which we used for Iraq) suggests a stock market value 
recovery of roughly 14 percent after the end of the second Intifada.
Table 6—The Tel Aviv Stock Market and Violence
ln(stock market) ln(stock market)
Variables (1) (2)
Con!ict probability −0.558***(0.1069)
Deaths −0.1255**( 0.0479)
Constant 6.592*** 6.367***
(0.0881) (0.0830)
Observations 21 21
R2 0.568  0.227
Notes: The time period is 2000IV–2005IV. OLS standard errors reported. Deaths are normal-
ized by their standard deviation.
*** Signi"cant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Signi"cant at the 5 percent level.
  * Signi"cant at the 10 percent level.
Sources: Stock market is the closing TA-25 index value. Deaths are total deaths from Jaeger 
and Paserman (2008). Con!ict probability is the EM estimate of the con!ict probability 
using deaths.
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In both cases, our results are purely illustrative, and there are a lot of assumptions 
behind them. But we hope that it shows the value of a having a structured approach 
to the underlying model of peace where the persistence of the underlying peace pro-
cess as well as the level of killing plays a crucial role. Given that one of the most dif-
"cult assessments that citizens living in con!ict areas have to make is whether peace 
will hold, this is surely central to assessing the economic value of reduced violence.
VII. Concluding Comments
This article has looked at the effect of violence in Northern Ireland on house 
prices. The peace process of this region provides an interesting context in which 
to look at the peace dividend as measured by home owners’ willingness to pay 
for houses. The novelty of our study lies partly in the data—we have both spatial 
(within-region) and quarterly temporal variation in violence to exploit in measuring 
how much changes in violence have affected house prices. Our approach also com-
pares "ndings from a standard OLS estimate with one derived from an empirical 
model which is more grounded in economic theory and a model of the underlying 
peace process.
Both approaches suggest that there is a negative relationship between house prices 
and killings in line with what we would expect. However, the economic model yields 
somewhat different conclusions on the size of the peace dividend and its distribution 
across regions. This makes sense since we would expect the process that generates a 
mapping between house prices and violence to vary according to the persistence in 
the reduction in violence. Also interesting is the evidence on spillover across areas 
suggesting that some kind of general equilibrium response to violence including 
migration across regions may be at work.
What we have estimated here is the non-macro component of the peace dividend. To 
the extent that there are common components that have lifted all regions of Northern 
Ireland, they are absorbed in the quarterly dummy variables. However, given other 
macro-effects including the rapid growth rate of the Republic of Ireland over this 
period, it is close to impossible to reliably estimate this effect. But it is perfectly pos-
sible that these effects are larger than those that we have estimated here. The evidence 
where other UK regions are used as a control group is suggestive of this.
Sustaining peace is always a challenge in places where there are long-lived politi-
cal and social tensions. It is necessary to convince those involved in supporting and 
perpetrating violence that there are manifest bene"ts to peace. This study shows 
that home owners’ willingness to pay to live in regions where violence decreased in 
Northern Ireland created a tangible stake in the maintenance of the peace process by 
capitalizing the future value of peace.
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